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HIS year's Survey contains an unusual proportion of Fifth Circuit
and bankruptcy court cases among the few noteworthy cases. For
the reader's convenience, the cases are grouped under topical
headings corresponding to the most important partnership law aspect of
the case.
I. DETERMINATION OF PARTNER STATUS
A. BALLARD V. UNITED STA TES1
The issue in Ballard asked whether an individual who had a managerial
relationship with a joint venture, and who was compensated from the
profits of the venture, was a partner in the venture and, therefore, jointly
and severally liable for the joint venture's obligations. 2 The issue was
not, as it often is, whether a partnership existed; rather, the question was
whether Ballard was a partner, or was an employee or agent compen-
sated by reference to the venture's profits.3
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
1. 17 F.3d 116 (5th Cir. 1994).
2. The particular obligation in this case was assessed payroll taxes not paid by the
joint venture.
3. The court acknowledged well-established Texas law that a joint venture is a part-
nership and a joint venture member is a partner. 17 F.3d at 118.
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Ballard brought a wrongful levy claim against the United States,
prompted by an Internal Revenue Service seizure and application of a
real estate commission payable to Ballard against the delinquent payroll
tax liability of the Omni/Vanir Joint Venture. Ballard argued successfully
on appeal that state law, not federal law, governed whether he was a part-
ner, and liable as such.4 Unfortunately for him, winning that point was
about the only satisfaction Ballard could take from the case. The Fifth
Circuit, applying Texas law, upheld the district court's conclusion that
Ballard was a partner in the OmniVanir Joint Venture and, therefore,
that he had joint and several liability for the joint venture's obligations,
including the unpaid payroll taxes.5
The Fifth Circuit noted the four attributes required by Texas law to find
a joint venture: "(1) a community of interest; (2) an agreement to share
profits; (3) an agreement to share losses; and (4) a mutual right of control
or management."'6 The court's application of those attributes to the facts
of this case was not entirely satisfying. For example, the court stated at
one point that Ballard expressly shared in the profits and losses of the
joint venture. 7 By contrast, the court referred to an amendment to the
Omni/Vanir Joint Venture Agreement that made Ballard a partner, stat-
ing "that Ballard would: (1) receive a five percent share in the profits and
losses of Omni/Vanir; (2) not have to make a capital contribution in ex-
change for this interest; and (3) not share in the obligations of Omni/
Vanir.' '8 The court seemed to bootstrap this issue by first concluding that
Ballard was a partner and, therefore, was liable for partnership obliga-
tions (thereby satisfying the loss-sharing requirement), and then finding
that any limitation on Ballard's liability was only an agreement among
partners that was not binding on third parties.9
The Fifth Circuit held that the "community of interest" requirement
was satisfied by the partners' profit-sharing and guaranty of loans relating
to the venture's various real estate projects.10 Similarly, the court readily
found that Ballard's active management of real estate projects for the
joint venture satisfied the mutual right of control or management."
4. The federal district court had held that federal law, which apparently defines part-
nerships more broadly than state law, governed. Id.
5. 1d. at 119.
6. Id. at 118.
7. Id.
8. d. at 117 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 118.
10. Id.
11. 1d. at 119. The court did acknowledge that Ballard's management authority was




B. PARTNER AND GUARANTOR LIABILITY ARE INDEPENDENT
1. Commons West Office Condos v. Resolution Trust Corporation12
This case began as a post-foreclosure declaratory judgment action by a
partnership/borrower against its lender, seeking a declaration that the
partnership had not defaulted on a loan. The original lender, Bexar Sav-
ings Association, was placed into receivership and its position succeeded
to by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), as receiver. The RTC
filed a counterclaim against the partnership and a third party action
against Clinton Weilbacher, individually under a guaranty and as general
partner of the partnership. Weilbacher mistakenly believed that a provi-
sion in his guaranty that limited his liability to twenty-five percent of the
partnership debts equally limited his liability as a general partner of the
debtor partnership. 13 Citing established Texas law,14 the 5th Circuit up-
held the district court's finding that Weilbacher's 100% joint and several
liability as a general partner' 5 was independent of the guaranty limitation
to twenty-five percent. The fact that Weilbacher subjectively intended to
be liable only to the extent of twenty-five percent was found to be
irrelevant.16
It is not uncommon in structuring real estate loan transactions to spe-
cifically take into account the distinction between a partner's liability for
a partnership's obligation and separate liability as a guarantor. For exam-
ple, a typical structure provides for a non-recourse partnership obligation
(that is, there is no liability of the partnership or its partners to the
lender), but then to obtain guaranties from one or more third parties,
including some or all of the partners. A common additional feature
would have the guaranties "burning off" after a certain portion of the
loan was repaid or the income generated by the property collateralizing
the loan reached and maintained a certain level for a specified period of
time, or a combination of both.'7
II. PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT CONTROLS RELATIONSHIP
A. ExxoN CORPORA TION V. BURGLI' 8
This was an appeal by four limited partners of a limited partnership, in
which Exxon Corporation was the general partner, of a summary judg-
12. 5 F.3d 125 (5th Cir. 1993).
13. Or, Weilbacher was making any argument he could think of, acting as his own
counsel.
14. Nance v. RTC, 803 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
15. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 15 (Vernon Supp. 1995) [hereinafter
TUPA].
16. Id.
17. With this kind of structure, until their liability as guarantors ended, the guarantors
have joint and several liability for the entire debt. After the guaranties expire, the nonre-
course features at the partnership level would flow through to the partners, resulting in no
personal liability for the indebtedness at either level. At that point, the lender must look
solely to the collateral security.
18. 4 F.3d 1294 (5th Cir. 1993).
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ment relating to Exxon's purchase of the limited partners' interests in the
partnership.19 The essence of the limited partners' claims was that Exxon
was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty in fail-
ing to disclose certain information affecting the valuation of the limited
partners' interests acquired by Exxon.
The first issue decided by the court was that Alaska, not Texas, law
governed, validating the choice made by the parties in the partnership
agreement governing their relationship. 20 The court cited the seminal
Texas case of DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.21 for the rule that a Texas
court will enforce a contractual choice of law "unless (1) the contract
bears no reasonable relation to the chosen state or (2) the law of the
chosen state violates a fundamental public policy of Texas."' 22 The court
logically concluded that Alaskan oil leases bear a reasonable relation to
Alaska, but it seemed to overstate things when it said that "Exxon could
not seriously contend that ... Alaska contract law offends the public
policy of Texas."'23 Of course there could be something in the contract
law of Alaska that offends fundamental Texas public policy - that's the
reason for the exception!
As a court applying Texas law would likely have done, the Fifth Circuit
largely deferred to the partnership agreement in defining the general
partner's duty, and in determining whether a failure to disclose in certain
situations was a breach of that agreement.24 The pertinent portion of the
agreement stated that the general partner was not obligated to furnish
certain types of information about leases that the general partner be-
lieved "would be in the best interest of the Partnership or the General
Partner to be kept confidential. '25 The next sentence of the same provi-
sion of the partnership agreement did obligate the general partner to an-
nually provide non-confidential information relevant to the evaluation of
the partnership interest of each limited partner.26 The court held that the
first provision recognized the general partner's need to protect itself from
the limited partners, in light of the limited partners' ability to engage in
other ventures, including those that would be potentially competitive.
27
The court then seemed to go unnecessarily far when it said: "Since this
provision abrogates the fiduciary duty of loyalty allowing partners to
compete with their partnership, it is reasonable to expect some limitation
on the fiduciary duty of disclosure."'28 Limited partners, and certainly
19. Id. at 1296.
20. Exxon was not a party to the original agreement, but succeeded to the interest of
Chevron after purchasing Chevron's interest. 4 F.3d at 1298.
21. 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990).
22. 4 F.3d at 1298 n.5 (citing DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677).
23. 4 F.3d at 1298, n.5.
24. Id Texas Supreme Court strongly supported the notion of "primacy of contract"
in Park Cities v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976).






any who are not involved in partnership activities, generally do not owe
the same fiduciary duties that are owed to them by a general partner.
29
Therefore, in the absence of a contractual limitation on permissible activi-
ties of limited partners, which could give rise to a breach of contract ac-
tion on a violation of the limitation, one ordinarily would not expect to
find a fiduciary duty limitation imposed on limited partners.
The Fifth Circuit could have skipped the point made at the end of the
preceding paragraph and relied, instead, on its next point - that the
partnership agreement was an arm's length agreement negotiated be-
tween sophisticated parties with the assistance of counsel.30 With the
strong deference to the parties' agreement, and after having previously
acknowledged that the parties had some freedom to alter their fiduciary
duties in that agreement, 3' the court was obligated under Alaska law to
honor the agreement. Therefore, after a brief diversion to determine that
Exxon had not breached an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing,
the only question left was whether Exxon, in fact, acted in accordance
with the parties' agreement.32
The plain meaning of the words chosen by the parties in their agree-
ment, as the court noted, was that the general partner was obligated to
provide the limited partners with information necessary to evaluate their
interests, unless the general partner believed that the information was
confidential.33 The general partner was contractually obligated to reach
its conclusion "in the exercise of its reasonable discretion and in light of
its fiduciary capacity," 34 which the court concluded that it did.
35
Although the court went to some lengths to carefully consider all of the
limited partners' arguments and to respond to each one of them by apply-
ing law to facts, it seems relatively obvious that the court was essentially
saying to the limited partners:
You were well represented by counsel when you entered into this
agreement; the agreement does not violate public policy; you made a
decision to sell based on your personal financial need, when you
could have deferred the decision until more information about a key,
incomplete partnership oil well was known; you could have rejected
the offer and continued as a partner or waited until additional infor-
mation was available; and, on top of all of this, you even could have
accepted the purchase price, then obtained a third party consultant's
opinion of value and, after the fact, rescinded the transaction if you
29. ALAN R. BROMBERG AND LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIPS § 6.07(a), at 6:70 n.5 (1994).
30. 4 F.3d at 1299.
31. Il at 1298 (citing to BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIPS § 6.07(h), at
6:89 (1991) and § 6.06, at 6:67 (arguing that "parties could at least circumscribe the right to
information") and § 6.05(d), at 6:59 (noting that parties can bargain over access to
information)).
32. 4 F.3d at 1299.





believed that you were inadequately compensated. Under all these
facts, we find that you were not treated unfairly.
The court did leave open the pursuit of potential claims for fraud or mis-
representation, on which it offered no opinion. 36
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - PARTNER LIABILITY FOR
PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATIONS
A. RTC v. BONNER37
Perhaps the first thing that one notes about Bonner is the number of
lawyers involved, which is not surprising given that it is a suit against
former officers and directors of a savings and loan association and against
a law partnership and its individual partners. In what many believe to be
as much an attempt to recover funds from the deepest pockets in the
neighborhood (i.e. insurance carriers providing directors and officers in-
surance and law firm professional liability insurance coverages), the RTC
has aggressively (some would say wantonly) pursued former directors and
officers and their professional advisers (lawyers and accountants). 38
In this summary judgment action,39 the two main issues to decide were
(1) the applicable statute of limitations40 and (2) how limitations should
be applied to a partnership and its partners. On the first issue, the court
noted that the relevant statute of limitations under Texas law, both for
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice, 41 was the basic
tort two-year statute.42 The RTC, which succeeded the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board when the savings association moved from conservator-
ship to receivership, argued that 12 U.S.C. section 1821(d)(14) called for
a three-year statute of limitations.4 3 The court found the three-year stat-
ute to be applicable.
36. Id. at 1302.
37. 848 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
38. The RTC's claim identified 14 transactions as the basis for its suit against the law
firm and its partners, the entire premise for which was that one of the firm's partners was a
director of the savings association that was the lender in the transactions. The court
quickly granted summary judgment on the 12 of the 14 transactions in which the law firm
had performed no legal services.
39. The summary judgment involving the 12 transactions on which the law firm had
performed no legal services, supra note 38, left 2 transactions in which the law firm per-
formed legal services, which are the basis for the opinion.
40. The parties agreed that the relevant statute began to run on the date that the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board was appointed conservator for University Federal Sav-
ings Association.
41. The basis of the suit here was breach of fiduciary duty, professional malpractice,
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and vicarious liability. 848 F. Supp. at 97.
42. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003 (Vernon 1986).
43. That section provides that "the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any
action brought by the Corporation as conservator or receiver shall be... in the case of any
tort claim, the longer of (I) the 3-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or
(II) the period applicable under State law." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) (1988).
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The main issue in the case was the effect on non-signatory partners of a
tolling agreement signed only by the partnership and one partner."4 The
RTC brought its claim against the individual partners after three years
from the date the statute of limitations began to run on the claim against
the partnership. The court seemed to take an "entity theory" of partner-
ship line of reasoning to support its conclusion that the partnership's exe-
cution of the tolling agreement extending the statute of limitations did
not bind the individual partners.45 Although the court supports its opin-
ion with statutory citations,46 it seems primarily to base its conclusion on
the parties' intent. The court simply felt that the terms of the tolling
agreement itself indicated an intent that the individual partners who did
not sign it were not to be bound by it. The court linked the following: (1)
although "partners are jointly and severally liable for the debts ... of the
partnership," 47 "[a] judgment against [the] partnership is not by itself a
judgment against a partner; '48 (2) a judgment can be entered "against an
individual partner only when that partner has been timely served with
process in the same suit;"' 49 (3) the individual assets of a partner are not
subject to pursuit by a partnership creditor unless a judgment has been
entered against the individual partner;50 and, therefore, (4) the individual
partners' assets are not exposed to liability for the partnership's obliga-
tions unless a judgment is obtained against the partner, individually. 51
Perhaps the strongest position taken by the court, and one that is very
dubious, is summarized in the following sentence: "Rather, just as the
individual partner must be individually served with process in order to be
bound in his individual capacity by a judgment against the partnership,
the individual partner must be named or expressly bound by a contract
signed on behalf of the partnership in order to be bound by such con-
tract. ' 52 Does this mean that if a partnership validly executes a promis-
sory note to evidence a loan from a bank, then no individual partner is
44. The tolling agreement was signed by the law firm's administrative partner and by
the individual partner who was the director of the savings association, but by none of the
other partners.
45. The court said that if the individuals had been intended to be bound by the tolling
agreement, there could have been included a reference to "SCW and its partners." 848 F.
Supp. at 99. Note the use of the entity theory in In re Jones, infra note 55, to reach a
directly contrary result.
46. 848 F. Supp. at 99. Curiously, the only partnership statutory citations used by the
court were to the Texas Revised Partnership Act, TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. art. 6132b-1.01 to -
13.09 (Vernon Supp. 1995), [hereinafter TRPA] which did not become effective until Janu-
ary 1, 1994, and which is not applicable to the partnership matters at issue in this case. The
TUPA does not apply to pre-existing partnerships that do not voluntarily accept applica-
tion of the new statute, until January 1, 1999.
47. 848 F. Supp. at 99. Again, the court cited to the TRPA § 3.04 instead of the TUPA
§ 15.
48. 848 F. Supp. at 99 (construing TRPA § 3.05).
49. Id.
50. Id.




liable unless it is "named or expressly bound by" that note? It just cannot
mean that.
The author understands the interplay of Texas partnership law and civil
procedure law to require that a partner be named and a judgment ob-
tained against it before a partner's individual assets may be pursued. 53
This means that a judgment obtained against a partnership in a case in
which a partner has not been named is not sufficient to support direct
pursuit of the partner's individual assets. On the other hand, because a
partner is jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the partner-
ship,54 such a judgment does serve as a basis to bring an individual claim
against the partner for that liability established against the partnership. If
the court here believed the law to be that filing a suit against the partner-
ship did not toll the statute of limitations against a partner not named in
the suit, it should have limited its holding to that basis. The following
case reaches a different result, although the tolling agreement/intent anal-
ysis emphasized in the Bonner court arguably supplies a basis on which
Bonner and In re Jones can be reconciled.
B. IN RE JONES5 5
This case involves essentially the same issue that was involved in RTC
v. Bonner, immediately above, but reaches a different and, the author
believes, correct result. Here, the Trustee-in-Bankruptcy for the Jones'
obtained a judgment against a partnership that it was unable to satisfy
from partnership assets. The Trustee therefore sought a personal judg-
ment against the partners for the partnership's liabilities. The partners
defended the Trustee's claim, in part, on the ground that the statute of
limitations had expired on a claim against them. None of the partners
was named in the suit against the partnership, although some appeared as
representatives of the partnership. The key issue in the case was deter-
mining when the statute of limitations began to run on the claims made
against the individual partners.
The court began by identifying the relevant statutory principles, includ-
ing the governing four year statute of limitations,56 the two provisions
governing service on a partnership and partners and taking judgments
against them,57 and the basic joint and several liability of partners under
the Texas Uniform Partnership Act.5 8 The court correctly stated that
these statutory provisions "make it clear that partners are jointly and sev-
53. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE (TCPRC) §§ 17.022, 31.003; TUPA § 15.
54. TUPA § 15.
55. 161 B.R. 180 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
56. TCPRC § 16.004(a)(3).
57. TCPRC § 17.022 provides that service on one member of a partnership authorizes
judgment against the partnership and the partner actually served, and TCPRC § 31.003
provides that a suit against several partners with joint liability under a contract allows
judgment against the partners actually served, but not a personal judgment or execution
against any partner who was not served.
58. TUPA § 15.
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erally liable for the debts of the partnership and that a judgment against
the partner can be obtained in a suit against the partnership. 59
Against that background, the court discussed three cases,60 following
one,61 refusing to follow one62 and distinguishing the third.63 The court
stated clearly its conclusions: "Limitations began to run against the part-
ners only when the district court's judgment became final. Clearly, this
action was brought within the four-year statute of limitations... ."64 The
court declined to follow the Cothrum Drilling Co.65 ruling on the ground
that it relied on pre-Texas Uniform Partnership Act law that followed the
aggregate theory more than the entity theory represented by the partner-
ship act.66 As noted, the court distinguished the Cissne case.
The court concluded its analysis with an ironic use of the principle of
res judicata. The defendants asserted that the Trustee's claims were
barred by res judicata, effectively urging that the Trustee's failure to
make them defendants in the action against the partnership barred the
Trustee from relitigating the same issues. The court responded that the
issues were not being relitigated; rather, liability was first being estab-
lished against the partnership and then the partners' individual liability
under section fifteen of the TUPA was being pursued.67 The irony was
the court's statement that res judicata prevented the partners from reliti-
gating liability already established against the partnership for which the
partners then had liability under the partnership act.
59. 161 B.R. 180, 182.
60. Each was discussed in an earlier issue of this survey. Carlyle Joint Venture v.
Zachry, 802 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied) discussed in Steven
A. Waters & Matthew D. Goetz, Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 S.W. L.J.
2011 (1992). Cothrum Drilling Co. v. Partee, 790 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990,
writ denied) and Cissne v. Robertson, 782 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ de-
nied) discussed in Steven A. Waters & Joni Gaylor, Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 45 S.W. L.J. 553, 566-67 (1991).
61. Carlyle, 802 S.W.2d at 814.
62. Cothrum Drilling, 790 S.W.2d at 786.
63. Cissne, 782 S.W.2d at 912.
64. 161 B.R. 180, 183.
65. Cothrum Drilling Co., 790 S.W.2d at 796.
66. 161 B.R. 180, 183. This author agrees with the court's assessment:
Under the entity theory of partnerships, it is logical that a partner has no
liability until the partnership liability is established. There is nothing wrong
in allowing the partners to be sued along with the partnership so that once
the partnership liability is established, a judgment can be rendered against
the partnership and the partners. On the other hand, there is nothing wrong
with the partnership being sued and, if its liability is established, a subse-
quent suit being filed against the partners on their personal liability for the
partnership's obligation.
Id. The court in Bonner, supra note 37, disagreed.
67. 161 B.R. 180, 184.
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